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The question of how structurally and pharmacologically diverse general anesthetics
disrupt consciousness has persisted since the nineteenth century. There has traditionally
been a significant focus on “bottom-up” mechanisms of anesthetic action, in terms of
sensory processing, arousal systems, and structural scales. However, recent evidence
suggests that the neural mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness may
involve a “top-down” process, which parallels current perspectives on the neurobiology
of conscious experience itself. This article considers various arguments for top-down
mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, with a focus on sensory processing
and sleep-wake networks. Furthermore, recent theoretical work is discussed to highlight
the possibility that top-down explanations may be causally sufficient, even assuming
critical bottom-up events.
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INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
The mechanism by which structurally and pharmacologically
diverse general anesthetics can render an individual unconscious
has remained incompletely understood since 1846. One of the
current controversies in the systems neuroscience approach to
this question relates to the primacy of top-down vs. bottom-
up mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. In the
context of this article, the term “bottom-up” has three differ-
ent meanings, which will always be explicit. The first meaning
of “bottom-up” relates to a neurocognitive hierarchy of sen-
sory processing, which might be best illustrated by considering
the neural processing involved in visual consciousness. After
retinal stimulation, visual information is transmitted to the lat-
eral geniculate nucleus in the thalamus followed by transmis-
sion to the primary visual cortex (V1) in the occipital lobe.
Visual processing thereafter follows two “streams” that flow
dorsally to the prefrontal cortex and ventrally to the tempo-
ral lobe. Thus, visual information is received by peripheral
sensors and transmitted in a bottom-up way to the thala-
mus, primary sensory cortex, higher modal processing areas,
and multimodal association cortex. The second meaning of
“bottom-up” relates to arousal pathways. From the pons to
the midbrain to diencephalic structures such as the hypotha-
lamus, a variety of subcortical nuclei project to and arouse
the cortex through the actions of distinct neurotransmitters.
This represents a bottom-up pathway from subcortical wake-
promoting nuclei to the cortex, sometimes with a synaptic relay
in the thalamus. The third meaning of “bottom-up” relates to
processes that occur from smaller to larger structural scales,
e.g., from the molecular, to the cellular, to the neuroanatom-
ical, to the network level of the brain. These three meanings
of “bottom-up”—referring to sensory, arousal, and structural
hierarchies—all have relevance to understanding the mechanism
of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.
In the context of this article, the term “anesthetic-induced
unconsciousness” refers to an unconscious cognitive state that
is just below the threshold of normal conscious perception of
the environment, with the further stipulation that the subject is
not being exposed to a noxious stimulus (e.g., surgery). As an
example, consider a human volunteer receiving an infusion of the
intravenous anesthetic propofol that is titrated to higher concen-
trations until she can no longer follow verbal commands—this
loss of responsiveness would be used as the (admittedly imper-
fect) surrogate of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. It should
be noted clearly that anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is not
equivalent to surgical anesthesia, because a noxious stimulus such
as a scalpel cutting through skin could easily reverse the uncon-
scious state in our hypothetical volunteer. Anesthetic-induced
unconsciousness may not be sufficient for surgical interven-
tion and is therefore not necessarily equivalent to our clinical
conception of general anesthesia.
WHY BOTTOM-UP FRAMEWORKS OF
ANESTHETIC-INDUCED UNCONSCIOUSNESS HAVE BEEN
DOMINANT
There are several reasons why bottom-up approaches to
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness have dominated the field.
With respect to the sensory or arousal hierarchy, conscious-
ness has often been deconstructed into wakefulness (an active
cortex, open eyes) and awareness (subjective experience). Our
understanding of wakefulness and brain arousal as mediated
by subcortical structures like the ascending reticular activating
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 115 | 1
SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE
Mashour Top-down mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness
system dates back some 65 years to the work of Moruzzi and
Magoun (1949). Similarly, the association of consciousness with
processing at the level of the primary sensory cortex remained
dominant until some 20 years ago when Crick and Koch for-
mally questioned whether visual consciousness was correlated
with activity in V1 (Crick and Koch, 1995). For more than a
decade, the “thalamic switch” hypothesis of anesthetic-induced
unconsciousness—which is characterized by the blockade of sen-
sory information from thalamus to primary sensory cortex—has
been highly influential (Alkire et al., 2000). Thus, the long-
standing viewpoint of consciousness and anesthesia as linked
to subcortical arousal and primary sensory processes is signif-
icantly more entrenched than the relatively recent perspective
of consciousness as a higher-order experiential process gener-
ated by network communication across association cortices. With
respect to structural scales, there is a general scientific tendency to
think of the term “mechanism” as a bottom-up process in which
actions at the molecular or “micro” level lead to causal events
that result in changes at the “macro” level. From this perspec-
tive, macro-level explanations merely supervene on micro-level
explanations (Hoel et al., 2013). This is also true in the his-
tory of research into anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. Since
1847, there have been a series of micro-level approaches to anes-
thetic mechanism, including effects on lipids (1847 through the
mid-1980s; for review of early theories see Perouansky, 2012)
and proteins (mid-1980s until the present; Franks and Lieb,
1984). Thus, the targets of general anesthetics have traditionally
been molecular, the foundational level of a bottom-up structural
hierarchy.
The 1990s was an important era in anesthetic mechanisms
research for four reasons. First, it became clear that there was
a neuroanatomical segregation of the major therapeutic end-
points of general anesthesia, with immobility mediated in the
spinal cord vs. unconsciousness and amnesia mediated in the
brain (Antognini and Schwartz, 1993; Rampil, 1994). Second,
the first neuroimaging studies of general anesthesia were con-
ducted, pointing to regional differences in anesthetic action rather
than global brain suppression (Alkire et al., 1995). Third, spe-
cific anesthetic binding sites on neurotransmitter receptors (most
notably, the gamma-aminobutyric acid [GABA] receptor) were
identified (Mihic et al., 1997). Fourth, it was first suggested that
general anesthetics might suppress consciousness through actions
on the subcortical nuclei that evolved to control sleep-wake states
(Lydic and Biebuyck, 1994), a decidedly systems neuroscience
approach. At least two of these developments—effects of anes-
thetics on neurotransmitter receptors and sleep-wake nuclei—are
explicitly bottom-up approaches to anesthetic mechanisms. The
focus on the molecular mediators of anesthetic action repre-
sents a bottom-up explanation from the perspective of structural
scales and the “shared circuits” hypothesis of sleep and anes-
thesia represents a bottom-up explanation in terms of arousal
systems. Both have received considerable attention and enjoy sig-
nificant empirical support. The goal of the present article is not
to argue that anesthetics have no effects on molecular targets or
subcortical structures such as sleep-wake nuclei, but rather to
counterbalance the tendency to think of anesthetic mechanisms
as a fundamentally or exclusively bottom-up process. There are
now several compelling lines of evidence to suggest that con-
sciousness and anesthetic-induced unconsciousness in humans
are higher-order processes and that, in principle, macro-level
mechanisms can be causally sufficient to explain such emergent
phenomena.
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING TOP-DOWNMECHANISMS OF
ANESTHETIC-INDUCED UNCONSCIOUSNESS
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ANESTHETIC-INDUCED UNCONSCIOUSNESS
ARE ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIMODAL ASSOCIATION CORTEX RATHER
THAN PRIMARY SENSORY CORTEX
A reasonable approach to understanding the mechanism of
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness would be to consider the
neurobiological underpinnings of conscious experience itself. As
noted, consciousness is sometimes reduced to the dissociable pro-
cesses of wakefulness and awareness. Importantly, wakefulness is
neither sufficient nor even necessary for conscious experience.
Dreaming is an example of how consciousness can occur in the
absence of wakefulness (demonstrating a lack of necessity) and
the vegetative state is an example of a presumably unconscious
state despite evidence of wakefulness (demonstrating a lack of
sufficiency) (Laureys, 2005). In terms of awareness, evidence is
accumulating that conscious experience does not correlate with
processing at the level of the primary sensory cortex. Numerous
studies using contrastive analysis, in which a sensory stimulus is
delivered at threshold and then brain activation patterns are “con-
trasted,” suggest that primary sensory processing is not sufficient
for conscious perception of a stimulus (for review see Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). Consciousness is, however, associated with
widespread activation of multimodal cortical networks, including
frontal, posterior parietal, and temporal areas (Figure 1). To sum-
marize, neither arousal from subcortical structures nor activity of
primary sensory cortex is sufficient for consciousness; processing
inmore distributed networks of association cortex appears to cor-
relate best with conscious experience. It is also worth noting that
many current and major theories of consciousness—including
global neuronal workspace theory (Dehaene and Changeux,
2011), integrated information theory (Tononi, 2012), predictive
coding (Clark, 2013), representationalism (Lau and Rosenthal,
2011)—consider some form of top-down or network-level pro-
cess to be critical for consciousness.
Just because consciousness is associated with activation of
more extended cortical networks does not necessitate that
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is as well. It is entirely pos-
sible that general anesthetics could block the transmission of
information from the periphery, inhibit arousal centers, block
thalamic relay of information to the primary sensory cortex,
or disrupt primary sensory processing. However, neuroimaging
data suggest that anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is associ-
ated with deactivation of more extended frontal-parietal net-
works, while primary sensory networks remain relatively intact
(Boveroux et al., 2010; Bonhomme et al., 2012) (Figure 2). This
is mirrored somewhat in the thalamus by preferential disruption
of “non-specific” thalamic nuclei, which are thought to play more
of an integrative role for cortical computation rather than a pro-
cessing station for sensory information (Liu et al., 2013). Again, it
is important to note that these findings may relate specifically to
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FIGURE 1 | Consciousness is not correlated with activation of primary
sensory cortex. This example of contrastive analysis demonstrates activation
of primary auditory cortex even in the absence of conscious perception. By
contrast, detection of the auditory stimulus is correlated with activation of a
widespread network prominently involving frontal-parietal networks.
Reproduced from Dehaene and Changeux (2011), Neuron, with permission.
FIGURE 2 | Anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is not correlated with
inactivation of primary sensory cortex. Transverse and sagittal sections of
primary visual (A,C) and auditory (B,D) cortices during wakefulness (A,B) and
propofol-induced unconsciousness (C,D); note the relative preservation
across states. Reproduced from Boveroux et al. (2010), Anesthesiology, with
permission.
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, the topic of interest, rather
than surgical anesthesia. It is clear that higher concentrations of
general anesthetics beyond those required for loss of responsive-
ness in a resting state can suppress primary sensory cortex (Ni
Mhuircheartaigh et al., 2013) and at yet higher concentrations can
cause more global suppression.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ANESTHETIC-INDUCED UNCONSCIOUSNESS
ARE ASSOCIATED WITH LATE EVOKED POTENTIALS RATHER THAN
EARLY ONES
The neuroanatomical substrates of consciousness and anesthetic-
induced unconsciousness give us a sense of the “where” of
consciousness or anesthesia but also have implications for the
“when” of consciousness or anesthesia. Studies using event-
related potentials suggest that conscious experience is correlated
with longer-latency potentials rather than early potentials (Del
Cul et al., 2007) (Figure 3). Not surprisingly, evoked-potential
data mirror the neuroanatomical structures of interest: early
potentials reflect more primary processing, while later poten-
tials reflect more integrative activity beyond the primary sensory
cortex (e.g., V1) or higher-order modality-specific processing
areas (e.g., V2 and beyond). Likewise, studies of anesthetic-
induced unconsciousness have revealed that longer-latency visual
evoked potentials are suppressed in a clear dose-dependent man-
ner, while early potentials remain unperturbed (Hudetz et al.,
2009) (Figure 4). These longer-latency potentials likely reflect, in
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FIGURE 3 | Consciousness is not correlated with early event-related
potentials. This electrophysiological study of visual processing concluded that
early event-related potentials (reflecting more primary sensory processing)
are not correlated with conscious perception. Top-down processing from
prefrontal cortex was more closely associated with consciousness.
Reproduced from Del Cul et al. (2007), PLoS Biology, with permission.
part, reentrant processing from anterior to posterior structures,
which appear to be preferentially suppressed in association with
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness in rats exposed to visual
flash stimuli (Imas et al., 2005). It is difficult to see how anes-
thetics can act in a bottom-up manner in terms of a sensory
hierarchy if visual information is still able to be transmitted
through the thalamus to the primary cortex and forward through
the dorsal stream, with only reentrant processing in the anterior-
to-posterior (i.e., top-down) direction affected.
The observation that late cortical potentials are preferen-
tially inhibited by general anesthetics is routine in the clinical
practice of neuroanesthesiology, the subspecialty of anesthesi-
ology that focuses on the perioperative care of neurosurgical
patients. During both intracranial and spinal procedures, the use
of sensory-evoked potentials to monitor neural function is com-
mon. In the case of somatosensory evoked potentials—reflecting
a pathway from the peripheral stimulation source, to synapses
in the medulla, thalamus, primary somatosensory cortex, and
multimodal cortex—there is a clear dose-dependent reduction
of amplitude and increase of latency. Importantly, late poten-
tials are the first to be suppressed, while subcortically-derived
and primary-sensory-related potentials are more robust (Banoub
et al., 2003). The preferential susceptibility of late potentials to
the effects of general anesthetics is especially evident when con-
sidering brainstem auditory evoked potentials. This complex,
polysynaptic pathway of early auditory processing is virtually
unperturbed by even supratherapeutic concentrations of anes-
thetics (Manninen et al., 1985). The sensitivity of late cortical
potentials—reflecting processing beyond the sensory cortex—
to the effects of anesthetics and the remarkable resilience of
brainstem potentials make it difficult to argue that bottom-up
sensory processes are being disabled, leading to dysfunction of
higher-order systems.
ANESTHETIC-INDUCED UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT DEPENDENT ON
KEY SUBCORTICAL SLEEP-WAKE NUCLEI
A variety of anesthetics has been shown to metabolically acti-
vate sleep-promoting nuclei and metabolically inhibit wake-
promoting nuclei. More recently, the inhaled anesthetic isoflurane
has been shown to activate directly the sleep-promoting neu-
rons within ventrolateral preoptic nucleus (VLPO), a key sleep-
promoting region in the hypothalamus (Moore et al., 2012).
It is remarkable that this general anesthetic—which typically
depresses neuronal function—activates neurons that are specifi-
cally active during sleep. From the systems-neuroscience perspec-
tive, it is not difficult to conceive of how anesthetic-mediated
unconsciousness could be a primarily bottom-up process from
the perspective of arousal pathways. Sleep is well known to be
generated by subcortical structures in the brainstem and dien-
cephalon, with resultant changes in levels of cortical activity and
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FIGURE 4 | Anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is not correlated with
effects on early evoked potentials. This study of visual evoked potentials
in rats demonstrates a clear dose-dependent effect of the inhaled
anesthetic desflurane on long-latency potentials, with sparing of early
potentials reflecting processing in primary visual cortex. Reproduced from
Hudetz et al. (2009), Anesthesiology, with permission.
consciousness (Saper et al., 2005). If, indeed, there are shared
circuits for sleep and anesthesia—as a number of studies would
suggest—then it stands to reason that anesthetic-induced uncon-
sciousness must follow a similar bottom-up path.
Although the shared-circuits hypothesis has shown promise,
the evidence is far from conclusive. Both intravenous and inhaled
anesthetics have been shown to metabolically activate VLPO
(Nelson et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2012), which would suggest
that VLPO is a key mediator of anesthetic-induced unconscious-
ness and would lead to the prediction that lesions of the VLPO
would eliminate or attenuate the ability of an anesthetic to induce
unconsciousness. However, lesions of the VLPO have only an
acute effect in conferring partial resistance to inhaled anesthetics.
Two studies have demonstrated that, with prolonged insomnia in
the absence of a functioning VLPO, animals ultimately become
hypersensitive to the effects of anesthetics (Eikermann et al.,
2011; Moore et al., 2012) (Figure 5). VLPO is therefore nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for anesthetic-induced unconscious-
ness. Furthermore, the anesthetic ketamine appears to suppress
VLPO activation despite its hypnotic effects (Lu et al., 2008).
Collectively, these data suggest that an activated VLPO does not
play a critical role in anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.
An alternative bottom-up mechanism of anesthetic-induced
unconsciousness that could be mediated through sleep-wake cir-
cuitry is the inhibition of subcortical arousal centers by general
anesthetics. However, key arousal nuclei have been shown to
have a limited role in anesthetic mechanisms. For example, orex-
inergic neurons in the hypothalamus do not appear to play a
role in anesthetic-induced unconsciousness; rather, they modu-
late the emergence from general anesthesia (Kelz et al., 2008).
FIGURE 5 | Ventrolateral preoptic nucleus is not necessary for
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. Lesions of the ventrolateral
preoptic nucleus reveal an acute effect of resistance but a chronic effect of
hypersensitivity to the inhaled anesthetic isoflurane. Reproduced from
Moore et al. (2012), Current Biology, with permission. ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Histaminergic neurons in the tuberomammillary nucleus (also in
the hypothalamus) have been thought to play a role in anesthetic-
induced unconsciousness (Luo and Leung, 2011), but recent
data bring the behavioral relevance of this nucleus into question
(Zecharia et al., 2012). Suppression of brainstem structures such
as the locus coeruleus may mediate anesthetic-induced uncon-
sciousness, since mutant mice lacking dopamine-B-hydroxylase
(which is required to synthesize norepinephrine in the locus
coeruleus) are more sensitive to anesthetics (Hu et al., 2012).
However, ketamine appears to activate the locus coeruleus in asso-
ciation with its hypnotic effects (Lu et al., 2008) and is dependent,
in part, on noradrenergic neurotransmission (Kushikata et al.,
2011). Although this list is certainly not exhaustive, it should be
clear that inhibition of a number of key arousal nuclei in the
brainstem and diencephalon does not appear to be necessary for
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.
The asymmetric role of some arousal nuclei in the process
of induction and emergence suggests that the two processes are
not mirror images of one another. Recently, a series of ele-
gant studies has provided strong support for the hypothesis
that there is a distinct neurobiology of induction and emer-
gence that accounts for the observation of anesthetic hysteresis
(Friedman et al., 2010; Joiner et al., 2013). Hysteresis implies
that the process of “coming out” of a state is not simply the
reverse process of “going in.” In this context hysteresis is man-
ifested as different anesthetic concentrations for induction of
and emergence from general anesthesia: higher concentrations
are associated with loss of consciousness compared with recov-
ery of consciousness. Why should this be the case? Evidence
suggests that there is a barrier to state transitions, termed neu-
ral inertia, which may be mediated by sleep systems (Joiner
et al., 2013). Neural inertia could explain hysteresis, but it
also has implications for the mechanism of anesthetic-induced
unconsciousness. Consider: higher concentrations of anesthetic
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are associated with induction compared to emergence, with sleep
networks accounting for the fact that an organism needs less anes-
thetic to stay anesthetized than to become anesthetized (Friedman
et al., 2010). However, this implies that sleep networks only play a
functional role after anesthetic-induced unconsciousness has already
occurred. Therefore, one implication of neural inertia is that sleep-
related processes do not play a critical role in the induction
of unconsciousness but rather are active during maintenance of
unconsciousness.
SEDATIVE-HYPNOTIC EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE CLASSES OF
ANESTHETICS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY A TOP-DOWN BUT NOT
BOTTOM-UP PROCESS
In the nineteenth century, an anesthesiologist could walk into
an operating room and use (for example) ether, chloroform or
nitrous oxide to induce unconsciousness or, at the very least, a
state in which the patient had lost “connected consciousness”
of the environment (Sanders et al., 2012). We could argue over
whether the state induced by ether was precisely the same state
as that induced by chloroform, but we would likely agree that
the same functional outcome had been achieved. In the twenty-
first century, an anesthesiologist can walk into an operating room
and use (for example) propofol, ketamine, or sevoflurane to
induce unconsciousness. It is likely that the state induced by
ketamine is quite different than the state induced by propofol,
but again a similar functional outcome would be achieved: the
patient would not be responding to commands or other environ-
mental stimuli, the patient would be deemed unconscious based
on this loss of responsiveness (not universally true, but usually
so), and the clinician could therefore start with the business of
the day. Although I have framed this in rather practical terms,
it is this similar functional outcome that motivates the inclu-
sion of these structurally and pharmacologically diverse drugs in
the class of general anesthetics. The relatively fungible nature of
these drugs in inducing unconsciousness is also at the core of the
anesthetic mechanisms problem: what is the common property
that allows us to use these highly diverse anesthetics in a very
similar way?
It has not yet been possible to identify a single and com-
mon bottom-up process that parallels the common functional
outcome resulting from the use of propofol, ketamine, and
sevoflurane (representatives of the three major classes of gen-
eral anesthetics). It is ketamine, in particular, that is generally
problematic. Unlike propofol, sevoflurane and many other gen-
eral anesthetics in current use, ketamine fails to (1) act primarily
through GABA receptors (Antkowiak, 1999; Salmi et al., 2005;
Zhou et al., 2013), (2) activate sleep-promoting nuclei (as noted
above) (Lu et al., 2008), (3) metabolically depress the thalamus
(Langsjo et al., 2005), or (4) depress fast activity of the electroen-
cephalogram (Lee et al., 2013). In other words, ketamine [and, to
some extent, nitrous oxide (Jevtovic-Todorovic et al., 1998)] fails
to conform to virtually all bottom-up frameworks of anesthetic
mechanisms: molecular, neuroanatomical, systems neuroscience,
and even the relatively macroscopic neurophysiologic approach.
By contrast, the top-down approach to ketamine-induced uncon-
sciousness has successfully identified a common neural corre-
late of unconsciousness induced by propofol, ketamine, and
sevoflurane that could have been predicted based on the neu-
robiology of consciousness (Lee et al., 2013) (Figure 6). Loss of
effective connectivity from the frontal cortex to more posterior
cortices has been consistently observed with all three drugs, sug-
gesting inhibition of reentrant processing as a candidate for the
common mediator of anesthetic effects on consciousness (Ku
et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2013). Furthermore, this loss of top-
down information processing was selective, because feedforward
processing (from posterior parietal to frontal area) appeared pre-
served. These data are supported by earlier animal studies, as
well as more recent studies in humans showing a disruption of
cortical communication by various anesthetic drugs (Ferrarelli
et al., 2010; Casali et al., 2013). Importantly, this approach reveals
parallels with pathological states of unconsciousness (Boly et al.,
2011). Although loss of reentrant processing (also referred to as
feedback, recurrent, reafferent, or reverberant processing) is cur-
rently only correlated with anesthetic-induced and pathological
unconsciousness, it is has strong mechanistic implications given
its proposed role in consciousness itself (Dehaene and Changeux,
2011). By contrast, no single bottom-up correlate or candi-
date mechanism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness across
all major classes of anesthetics has been identified or empirically
supported.
The association of cortical network events with anesthetic-
induced unconsciousness may not be compelling because it is
possible that they are simply following the mechanistic parade
rather than leading it. We know that modulation of sleep-wake
neurons can result in dramatic changes of cortical networks, but
can modulation of cortical neurons have a widespread effect? The
answer appears to be yes. It has been demonstrated that activa-
tion of a single cortical neuron can lead to transitions in global
brain states and produce measurable changes in behavior (Brecht
et al., 2004; Houweling and Brecht, 2008; Li et al., 2009), sup-
porting the possibility that even small cortical areas affected by
general anesthetics can be instrumental in behavioral and brain
state transitions.
MACRO CAUSATION CAN SUPERSEDE MICRO CAUSATION
One straightforward and plausible way of explaining top-down
mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness would be
that the activity or dynamics of the cortical networks medi-
ating awareness are more susceptible to the effects of gen-
eral anesthetics than subcortical nuclei mediating sleep-wake
states. Demonstrating a more significant contribution—or per-
haps an earlier contribution—to unconsciousness by disruption
of higher-order cortical processes vs. subcortical or lower-order
cortical processes would help resolve the question of top-down
vs. bottom-up mechanisms within a sensory or arousal hierar-
chy. A robust quantitative theory of cortical dynamics will be
critical for this line of investigation. However, one might still
make the reasonable claim that cortical disruption is not really the
true mechanism because it can still be reduced to the underlying
molecular mechanisms of anesthetic binding to neurotransmit-
ter receptors or ion channels (i.e., some bottom-up event on a
structural scale). It has previously been suggested that it might be
helpful to divide anesthetic mechanisms into root and proximate
causes, where diverse root causes at the molecular level might be
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FIGURE 6 | Inhibition of top-down connectivity is a common correlate of
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness across three distinct classes of
general anesthetics. This figure depicts frontal-to-parietal (feedback) and
parietal-to-frontal (feedforward) connectivity before, during and after
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness in surgical patients (A–C). Lower panels
(D–F) show asymmetry of directional connectivity, with positive values
representingfeedbackdominanceandnegativevaluesrepresentingfeedforward
dominance. Connectivitywasmeasured using electroencephalography and
symbolic transfer entropy, which is rooted in information theory. Blue shaded
area represents induction of anesthesia; the period before induction is baseline
consciousness and the period after is anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.
Each state is separated into three substates of Baseline (B1–B3) and
Anesthetized (A1–A3) conditions; the timescale is different because patients
receiving ketaminewere studied using a different protocol than patients
receivingpropofol andsevoflurane. FB, Feedback; FF, Feedforward.Reproduced
from Lee et al. (2013), Anesthesiology, with permission.
translated across scales to a common proximate cause at the level
of cortical information processing (Mashour, 2013). This would
lead to a bottom-up framework with individual micro-causes
converging on a single macro-level causality. From this perspec-
tive, the macro cause would simply supervene on the micro cause.
In other words, once the micro level is fixed (e.g., binding of
propofol to the GABAA receptor), so too is the macro level—
and therefore the underlying micro event has done all of the real
causal work.
Recent theoretical efforts have shown that macro-level pro-
cesses might trump micro-level processes when it comes to true
causation. It has been demonstrated in a simulation that a true
emergent event can occur in which the macro-level causation
contains more effective information than the micro-level causa-
tion (Hoel et al., 2013). In other words, the macro level is actually
doing more of the causal work than the micro level. This sug-
gests the possibility of macro-level supersedence in addition to
the usual assumption of macro-level supervenience. Applying this
principle to anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, it is therefore
possible that observations at the top-down/macro-level may con-
tain more effective information than the micro-level and thus
causally supersede molecular events such as anesthetic bind-
ing. This would not imply that anesthetic binding is irrelevant
to anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, but rather that it might
not add further information to a macro-causal explanation. It is
important to note that there is currently no evidence that this
is the case. However, it is now at least conceivable that there
could be a single causal explanation of anesthetic-induced uncon-
sciousness at the macro level (e.g., cortical dynamics) that is
not enhanced by the addition of micro-level information (e.g.,
molecular binding).
DISCUSSION
Traditionally, various bottom-up molecular mechanisms have
been proposed to explain anesthetic-induced unconscious-
ness, including disruption of the lipid bilayer and modulation
of protein-based neurotransmitter receptors or ion channels.
From the neurocognitive perspective, bottom-up explanations
of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness have focused on subcor-
tical nuclei that mediate the sleep-wake cycle or early cortical
areas that mediate sensory processing. There is growing evidence,
however, that general anesthetics disrupt higher-order cognitive
processes and that networks of association cortex may be par-
ticularly susceptible to anesthetic effects; this evidence parallels
current thinking in the science of consciousness. Thus, top-down
mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness warrant seri-
ous consideration. It is possible that the observed changes in the
cortex are not simply signatures of lower-order anesthetic actions,
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but rather that direct modulation of cortical dynamics may be the
mechanism of unconsciousness. Furthermore, it is now at least
conceivable that such an explanatory framework could represent
a sole macro-level causation that supersedes any bottom-up or
even molecular description.
Intellectual bias is difficult to escape and thus it is probably
better to disclose such bias rather than having it function as a
“hidden variable” that shapes the discourse in a covert way. As
an anesthesiologist and clinical researcher, my work has focused
on the problem of intraoperative awareness with explicit recall
and the possibility of brain monitoring techniques that are rooted
in the neuroscience of consciousness. As such, the cortex—which
is more accessible to study and monitoring in the operating room
setting—has been a focus. As a neuroscientist and conscious-
ness researcher, my focus is on the network-level interactions that
most current theories deem to be critical for experiential process-
ing. Such clinical and scientific predilections clearly influence my
perspective. As such, in this article I have focused on arguments
supporting the top-down approach—the reader is encouraged to
explore the considerable evidence for alternative perspectives and
to draw his or her own conclusions. It is also important to note
that bottom-up and top-down perspectives need not be mutually
exclusive. This is especially relevant for the higher-order thalamic
nuclei, which primarily receive cortical input and are intimately
involved in cortical function.
One point deserves emphasis before succumbing to the temp-
tation of disregarding top-down causation on the basis of its
inconsistency with the known effects of general anesthetics across
species (Crowder, 2008). General anesthetics can stop single-cell
organisms, fruit flies, and worms in their tracks. . . so who needs a
cortical network for a satisfactory explanation of anestheticmech-
anism? First, it is important to note that the anesthetic endpoint
in these model systems is movement alone. Although one could
rightfully argue that all endpoints relate to some kind of motor
response, the endpoint of impaired movement inDrosophila orC.
elegans cannot necessarily be regarded as a surrogate for impaired
perception (van Swinderen, 2006; van Swinderen et al., 1999). It is
therefore not even clear that the term “anesthetic-induced uncon-
sciousness” applies here as it would for Homo sapiens. Second,
as species evolve, so too do the networks governing their behav-
ior and the mechanisms by which behavioral state transitions
occur. For example, if we were investigating the mechanism of
movement in humans, we might consider the motor cortex and
supplementary motor area as starting points. It would be absurd
to claim that the motor cortex could not be involved in the
primary mechanism of movement in humans based on the argu-
ments that worms move, but worms do not have a motor cortex.
Similarly, it would be absurd to claim that higher-order corti-
cal processes cannot be causally central to the mechanisms of
anesthetic-induced unconsciousness in humans simply because
worms or other species do not exhibit higher-order cortical
processes.
CONCLUSION
The mechanism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is a fun-
damental question in both anesthesiology and neuroscience, with
links to the neurobiology of consciousness itself. An emerging
body of evidence suggests that both consciousness (in the experi-
ential sense of the word) and anesthetic-induced unconsciousness
are mediated by higher-order processes in the brain. Top-down
approaches to anesthetic mechanisms may therefore provide crit-
ical insight to both the scientific understanding and clinical
practice of anesthesiology.
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